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"We'll be keeping an eye on you."
ChiefJustice Burger at the inaugurationof2the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit.
I. INTRODUCTION

Since 2006, the Supreme Court has profoundly shifted the rights
and relationships between patentees and potential infringers.3 The Court
1. Alan B. Parker, Rerninger Co., LPA.
2. Judge Giles Sutherland Rich, My Favorite Things, 35 IDEA 1, 6 (1994).
3. Three opinions reduced the power of the patentee or increased the ability of an accused
infringer to invalidate a patent. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)
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of Appeals for the Federal Circuit4 ("Circuit") has exclusive5 and
national jurisdiction over patent appeals.6 However, the Circuit is
generally the court of last resort for patent cases. Its judges are patent
authorities; their decisions are rarely reviewed. The Supreme Court's
newfound interest in patent law is noteworthy in itself.7 The recent
attention from the high court and the reversals of Circuit precedent
appear to be a reaction to concerns that the Circuit is exhibiting some
unappreciated characteristics of a specialized court.
Specialized courts are associated with certain tendencies and
patterns of behavior, including:
The aggregation or centralization of decision-making to the specialized
authority. One would expect a specialized court to suspect a nonexpert's ability to correctly decide the issues in the specialty field.
Thus, as expected, appellate courts could shift decision making toward
judges and away from juries.

An increasing role of the court within its specialty jurisdiction. A
specialized appellate court could afford less deference to trial judges
than a non-specialized appellate court. With less deference, one can
expect higher rates of review and higher reversal rates in a field
supervised by a specialized appellate court.
The development of specialized rules and doctrines. Over time a
specialized court and a specialized legal practice will diverge from
mainstream practices. The court and lawyers develop distinct jargon,

(requiring the patentee to satisfy the four-factor equitable test to obtain a permanent injunction);
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, 127 S.Ct. 764, 777 (2007) (allowing a licensee to challenge patent
validity); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 1727 (2007) (expanding the challenge to the
validity of a patent for § 103 obviousness grounds). A dissenting opinion issued in a denial of
certiorari revealed that three justices would review whether patentable subject matter is too
expansive, and question whether current jurisprudence affords too much patent protection. Lab.
Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., cert. dismissed, 548 U.S. 124, 138 (2006) (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
4. Marcia Coyle, Critics Target Federal Circuit, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Oct. 19,
2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1161162317072; Gregory A. Castanias, et al, Survey
of the FederalCircuit's PatentLaw Decisions in 2006: A New Chapter in the Ongoing Dialog with
the Supreme Court, 56 AM. U. L. REv. 793, 848 (2007).
5. To be accurate, a nearly exclusive subject matter jurisdiction. The regional circuits retain
some jurisdiction to determine patent issues under Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation
Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830(2002), where the "well pleaded complaint" did not raise a patent issue
directly, but the subject arose and required ruling in the course of the litigation.
6. 28 U.S.C. §1295.
7. See, Mark D. Janis, PatentLaw in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REv. 387, 387 (2001); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Return of the Supreme Court to Patent Law, 1
AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 1 (2007).
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practices, and cultures. That in turn discourages non-specialists from
entering the practice. These tendencies amplify the trend toward
greater distinctiveness and isolation in the court and its bar.
Doctrines and practices that favor the dominant interests within the
specialty field. A patent specialty court may create rules that promote
the use of its principal constituency - patent lawyers.
Before the Circuit's 8 creation, concern existed that the court may
develop doctrinal isolation as a consequence of being a quasi-specialized
court. 9 This paper observes that patent cases have characteristics that are
distinctive to the specialty. These characteristics have included:
Trial judges, not the jury, are to decide certain factually intensive key
issues.
A high reversal rate, which corresponds with relatively little deference
for trial courts' rulings.
Law that fell out of step with other areas of practice. Notable
examples in patent practice included unique rules on attorney-client
privilege and injunctive relief.
Doctrines and practices that encourage the employment of patent
lawyers. Until recently this included an affirmative duty to obtain
legal opinions as to patent enforceability. One could, to some degree,
view each of the characteristics discussed in this paper as favoring
patent lawyers, who are arguably the most dominant identifiable group
to benefit from a specialized court.
While the Supreme Court's recent scrutiny has not criticized the
Circuit for being specialized per se, its opinions do raise concerns that
the Circuit applies rules that do not align with approaches by other
appellate circuits. Other statements by the Justices suggest that the
Circuit's development of patent law is out of balance in favor of
patentees, or that the Circuit's patent law decisions weigh heavily
toward the interest of the patent bar.
The Circuit has an explicit Congressional mandate to promote
uniformity in patent law.' The Circuit's first chief judge, Howard T.

8. At times in this paper, the Federal Circuit will be referenced as "CAFC" for brevity and
convenience.
9. See infra § 5.
10. H.R. REP. No. 312, at 20-23 (1981).
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Markey, embraced the mandate, but rejected the criticism that
"specialization" would negatively impact the court.
From its very first case, the Federal Circuit set out to meet Congress'
express intent that it contribute to increased uniformity and reliability
in the fields of national law assigned . . . The Federal Circuit also

recognized at the outset that assurance of reliability required the
maintenance of a maximum level of uniformity among its own
statements of the law. Simply put, a court created to reduce existing
conflicts would fail in its mission if its opinions were to create new
jurisprudential conflicts... Now that over 10,000 appeals have been
decided, early assumptions that the Federal Circuit would somehow be
more "specialized" than the regional circuit courts appear to have been
abandoned - and rightly so."

Despite Judge Markey's comments, the concerns he dismissed live
on. The court's behavior explored in this paper - a tendency to
consolidate decision-making power within the court of appeals, to
expand its influence within its specialty, and to distinctively apply rules
and develop doctrine - are the kinds of conduct expected from
specialized courts.' 2
The CAFC's trend toward distinctiveness may be unintended. It
may also be unappreciated, especially on the court and within the patent
bar. The patent bar is the Circuit's principal constituency and it
exercises an important role in the selection and confirmation of Circuit
Judges. 13 The patent bar also shapes the attitudes and perspectives of the
judiciary, because issues are framed and analyzed for courts through
attorney briefing. 14 As compared to the regional circuits, the Circuit

II. Howard T. Markey, The FederalCircuit and CongressionalIntent, 2 FED. CIR. B. J. 303,
304 (1992).
12. Simon Rifkind, A Special Court for Patent Litigation? The Danger of a Specialized
Judiciary, 37 A.B.A.J. 425, 425 (1951); COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT
APPELLATE SYSTEM STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE,

92nd Cong. 2nd Sess., 86 Stat. 807 (1975), reprintedin 67 F.R.D. 195, 234-36; William M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Patent Court, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 111, 111
(2004); JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL A. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS AND

LA WYERS PUT lNNOVATORSATRISK, § 3.1, (2008).
13. The New York Patent Bar Association, for example, was self-designated to evaluate
Federal Circuit nominees and report to the Congressional committees with respect to its findings.
Its self-designation has been accepted; its report has become a routine step in the confirmation
process. See, Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System,
138 U. PA. L. REv. 1111, 1148-49 (1990).
14. It has also been argued that the patent bar in general favors a lenient standard of
patentability. Among other effects, a lenient standard serves the patent bar's interest in successfully
securing patents for clients, and enlarges the scope of the patent system's reach, thereby maximizing
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hears a less diverse spectrum of cases, and considers a higher
concentration of patent cases. Patent specialists, i.e., attorneys who are
required to be educated or experienced in scientific or engineering fields
for admission to practice before the U.S. Patent Office, typically argue
patent cases. The effect is to expose the Circuit to a relatively
homogeneous set of lawyers: technically sophisticated, scientifically
educated, and frequently specialized practitioners. Over time the
institutional influences trend toward insularity and distinctiveness, even
when special interest influence is not intended or perceived by the
lawyers or judges.
Whether or not special interest influence on a court really exists
may be less important than whether the court's audience of policy
makers, superior courts, and interest groups with political weight
perceive such influence. 5 Some perceive a specialized court to be more
likely to have a 'mission' orientation than a generalist court. That has
been the experience with the Circuit; it has defined its mission as
"promoting technological progress by enlarging patent rights.' 16 Even if
an institution performs well objectively, its power and effectiveness can
nevertheless be limited if it is perceived to be negatively influenced by
the interests or constituencies it serves.
Therefore, after reviewing jurisprudence that is consistent with the
predicted behavior of specialized courts, this paper will discuss some
recent Supreme Court cases which address some of the Circuit's
In addition to examining evidence of
distinctive jurisprudence.
characteristics consistent with specialization-caused effects, this paper
will highlight several examples suggesting that the perception is growing
at the Supreme Court that the Circuit is behaving as a specialized court developing distinctive jargon and rules, and unduly tending to its
constituency. That perception may or may not be justified, but there are
signs that the CAFC is responding to the perception in its early cases
implementing the Supreme Court rulings.
We may be witnessing a significant new relationship between the
Supreme Court and the Circuit, and the beginning of a new chapter in
the CAFC's history. The Circuit has eradicated the geographical

patent attorney business. See, Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization, Litigant Influence, and
Substantive Policy: The Court of Customs andPatentAppeals, 11 LAW & Soc'Y 823, 835 (1977).
15.

See LAWRENCE BAuM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL

BEHAVIOR (2006).
16. William M. Landis & Richard A. Posner, The PoliticalEconomy of Intellectual Property
Law, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, 26 (2004), available at
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040608_Landes.pdf.
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inconsistencies of pre-CAFC patent law and has brought technical
competence and policy expertise to patent adjudication. In the process,
though, the Circuit has succumbed to some of the predicted problems
that characterize specialized tribunals. The Supreme Court and the
Circuit may be recognizing the need to temper the CAFC's technical
sophistication against the tendency to overextend its judicial role.
II. PREDICTING THE TENDENCIES OF SPECIALIZED COURTS
17
American courts typically have broad subject matter jurisdiction.
Specialized courts on the federal level are relatively rare, 8 and criticism
typically follows proposals for them.1 9 Three decades before the
Circuit's creation some predicted that a specialized court may create a
divergent body of law.
The patent law does not live in the seclusion and silence of a Trappist
monastery. It is part and parcel of the whole body of our law . ..In
time such a body of law, secluded from the rest, develops a jargon of
its own, thought-patterns that are unique, internal policies which it
subserves and which are different from and sometimes at odds with the
policies pursued by the general law . . . Very soon their internal
language becomes so highly stylized as to be unintelligible to the
uninitiated. That in turn intensifies the seclusiveness of that branch of
the law and that further immunizes it against the refreshment of new

17. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 vests United States District Courts with "original jurisdiction of all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
18. In recent times, specialized courts have included the Court ofInternational Trade, the Tax
Court, the Court of Veterans Affairs, the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, the Special
Court under the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, the Court of Military Appeals, the
Court of Claims, and, arguably, the Bankruptcy Court. Some of these courts do not possess
exclusive jurisdiction even in their field, e.g. tax cases may be brought in either district court or the
tax court. The bankruptcy court frequently conducts trials that apply all substantive areas of law in
order to assess the validity of a creditor or debtor claim. Thus, even though these are specialty
courts, they arguably benefit more directly from the contributions of and competitions from other
courts.
19. Simon Riflind, A Special Court for Patent Litigation? The Danger of a Specialized
Judiciary, 37 A.B.A.J. 425, 425-26 (1951); COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT
APPELLATE SYSTEM STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE

(1975) (The Hruska Commission Report), reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195, 234-6. "[A] widespread
sentiment was evident among the bench and bar against having 'specialized courts," according to
the assistant attorney general who headed the Office for Improvements in the Administration of
Justice. Daniel J. Meador, Origin of the FederalCircuit: A PersonalAccount, 41 AM. U. L. REV.
581, 587-88 (1992).
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which constitute the
ideas, suggestions, adjustments and compromises
20
very tissue of any living system of law.

Indeed, shortly after Judge Rifiind wrote those comments, the
Circuit's predecessor court began to pursue a new policy direction in
patent law. From the 1920s through the mid 1950s there was consistent
support for rigorous standards of patentability in all federal courts,
district courts, courts of appeals including the CCPA, and the Supreme
Court.2 1 However, in the late 1950s the CCPA "diverged from the
judicial 'mainstream' in its support for relatively lenient standards. 22
The Court's change in course has been attributed to the appointment of
patent specialists to the bench. In turn, the patent bar played a greater
role in the selection of the CCPA judges.23 While the patent bar did not
seek a specific change in court policies, the appointment of patent
specialists populated the court with members who were likely to share
the policy preferences that dominate the patent bar, presumably
including a relatively lenient patentability standard.
The patent specialists on the court, appointed through the efforts of the
patent bar, have lead the CCPA to adopt a line of policy significantly
different from the patent policies that prevail in most of the federal
judiciary. The CCPA's specialization ultimately has been responsible
for the court's distinctive path in the past two decades ... The case of
the CCPA, then, does not establish that specialized courts necessarily
will behave differently from generalists. Rather, it indicates only that
specialization may create conditions that cause a court to take a
distinctive path.24

Despite the emerging trend, by the time of final hearings on the
Circuit's creation, the possibility that the tribunal might behave like a
20. Simon Ritkind, A Special Courtfor Patent Litigation? The Danger of a Specialized
Judiciary,37 A.B.A.J. 425,425-26 (1951).
21. Lawrence Baum, JudicialSpecialization,Litigant Influence, and Substantive Policy: The
Courtof Customs andPatentAppeals, 11 LAW & SOCIETY 823, 839 (1977).
22. Id. at 839.
would be difficult to get the patent bar excited about the
23. This is to be expected since "[i]t
appointment of an appellate judge who might hear only two or three patent appeals a year, but if the
judge were going to be a member of the court that heard all patent appeals, the patent bar and its
clients would exert themselves to influence the selection." William M. Landis & Richard A.
Posner, An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Patent Court, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 112 (2004). Professor
Landis and Judge Posner have observed that "[t]he most certain effect of the creation of the court
has been to increase the demand for the services of patent lawyers." William M. Landis & Richard
A. Posner, The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Law, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for
Regulatory Studies, 26 (2004), http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040608_Landes.pdf.
24. Lawrence Baum, JudicialSpecialization,Litigant Influence, and Substantive Policy: The
Court of Customs andPatentAppeals, I1 LAw & SOC'Y REv. 823, 845-46 (1977).
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specialty court received little attention.25 The Department of Justice
Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice acknowledged
that appellate courts generally should not be specialized,26 but
would not be a '"specialized court'
maintained that the proposed Circuit
27
used.
normally
is
term
that
as
One witness testifying in favor of the new Circuit responded to the
arguments against a specialized court. The testimony predicted one of
today's major criticisms of the Circuit:
CONTENTION . . .Presumed expertise of single court of appeals
would encourage attempts to retry cases at the appellate level and
encourage the court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court,
thereby changing the standards and level of review.
Response... To the extent the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
is reviewing questions of fact from a lower court, that review will be
review by all Federal appellate
subject to the same restrictions as is 28
courts of district court findings of fact.

What the witness failed to foresee was the Circuit's development of
a jurisprudence based on issues of mixed fact and law, and that the court
would conduct de novo reviews of findings that were inherently
factual.29 More testimony foreshadowing the court's future conduct
came at the end of the hearing.
Given the existing jurisdiction of the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, and the proposed jurisdiction of the new court, that court will
be a highly specialized court at its inception, and is likely to remain so
for an extended period of time. There is substantial risk that such a
specialized court would be less prone to adhere to the 'clearly

25. Add. to Hearings before the Subcomm. on Improvements in JudicialMachinery on the
Comm. on the Judiciary United States S., 96th Cong., S.677 and S.678 Fed. Courts Improvement
Act, No. 96-24 (1979).
26. Id. at 31 (statement of Daniel J. Meador, Asst. Att'y. Gen.).
27. Id. at 37-38 (Statement of Daniel J. Meador, Asst. Att'y. Gen.). The Department noted
that the court would hear a varied docket, including cases involving federal claims, Indian claims,
pay disputes, and certain tax claims. At the time of the hearings the reforms also included proposals
for Federal Circuit jurisdiction over trademark and copyright - subject matter that was later dropped
from the Act.
28. Id. at 58 (statement of Donald R. Dunner, patent Att'y).
29. The Supreme Court, it must be said, countenanced such an approach in patent claim
construction. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
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erroneous' standard for appellate30 review, set forth in Rule 52 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Despite these and other occasional references objecting to the
danger of specialization, by 1979 the hearings are most remarkable for
their lack of such reservations - especially once proposed jurisdiction
over trademark, copyright, and tax cases fell out of the legislation.
At the time, patent law badly needed national uniformity, because
forum shopping was rampant as plaintiffs searched for favorable law
from among the regional circuits.3 1 Although Congress did not display
overt concern over the Circuit wielding special power and status, the
32
judges of the newly formed court were aware of the potential
Some of the trends predicted by opponents of the CAFC have
become manifest. 33 The CAFC has expanded its influence in two
respects. First, the Circuit has reduced the role of the USPTO and the
district courts in claim interpretation, while expanding its own role.
Second, the CAFC and its predecessor court have expanded the scope of
patentable subject matter.34 Such behavior is consistent with the premise
that specialized courts are more likely to expand their influence as
compared to generalized courts.3 5

30. Add. to Hearings before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery on the
Comm. on the Judiciary United States Senate, 96th Cong., S. 677 and S. 678 Federal Courts
Improvement Act, No. 96-24, p. 91 (1979) (statement of John 0. Tramontine, New York Patent
Law Association). Notably, Mr. Tramontine was the last witness - the slot often reserved for pro
forma opposition during committee hearings.
31. See, e.g., S. REP. P.L. 97-275, FEDERAL COURTS IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1982 AT 4 (1982)
(explanation of Bill).
32. Chief Judge Markey reminisced that, "[t]he Federal Circuit also recognized the special
responsibility placed on it as the probable court of last resort in most of its cases." Howard T.
Markey, The FederalCircuitand CongressionalIntent, 2 FED. CIRCUIT B. J. 303, 304 (1992).
33. E.g., "a jargon of its own, thought-pattems that are unique, internal policies which it
subserves and which are different from and sometimes at odds with the policies pursued by the
general law." Rifldnd, A Special Court for Patent Litigation? The Danger of a Specialized
Judiciary,37 A.B.A.J. 425, 425-26 (1951).
34. E.g., In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (digital oscilloscope utilizing
mathematical principles to display a smooth waveform eligible subject matter despite "mathematical
algorithm" exception); State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Application of Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40, 43 (C.C.P.A. 1978),
rehearing sub nom. Application of Berg,, 596 F.2d 952, 987 (C.C.P.A. 1979), affirmed sub nom.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980).
35. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Patent Court, 71
U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 111-12 (2004); JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL A. MEURER, PATENT FAiLURE:
HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATSAND LA WYERS PUTINNOVATOPS ATRISK, § 3.1, (2008).
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III. PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION - FACT-FINDING BY THE
APPELLATE COURT

Patent claim construction is a clear and controversial 36 example of
decision-making power resting in the court of appeal. The claim
construction ruling is a key step in patent infringement litigation. The
ruling defines the patent's claims in laymen's terms. Often though, there
is no jury trial, because the ruling is outcome determinative; whatever
falls within the construed language of the claim will by definition
infringe. Therefore, after the claim construction ruling the matter is
resolved by summary judgment, settlement, or capitulation by one of the
litigants. In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 7 the Supreme
Court held that claim construction is exclusively the province of the
court. The Circuit interpreted the holding as subjecting the district
court's claim construction to de novo review.3 8 For nearly a decade now,
the Circuit has treated claim construction entirely as a matter of law with
no deference afforded the trial court determination.39
The judges of the CAFC disagree over the wisdom of de novo
review.40 Judges Michel and Rader challenge the premise that claim
construction is a purely legal question without a factual component.
"[T]he claim construction exercise often cannot be answered without
assessing, at least implicitly, what the average artisan knew and how she
thought about the particular technology when the patent claims were
written."41 Judge Newman observes that the "Federal Circuit's position
that patent interpretation requires more rigorous appellate review than
other fact/law issues has not well withstood the test of experience. 4 2
Judge Rader "urge[s] this court to accord deference to the factual
components of the lower court's claim construction. 4 3 Judges Gajarsa,
Linn, Dyk, and Moore indicate at least a willingness to reconsider de

36. See Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More
Predictable? 9 LEwIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 231-33, n.2 (2005).
37. 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384 (1996).
38. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc); Phillips

v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
39. Cf., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 443 (1996) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(asserting that "mixed questions require courts to construe all record inferences in favor of the
factfinder's decision and then to determine whether, on the facts as found below, the legal standard
has been met").
40. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1045 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(denying petition for rehearing en banc).
41. Id.at 1040-41.
42. Id. at 1043.
43. Id. at 1044.
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novo review of claim construction in an appropriate case. 44 Judge Mayer
indicted de novo review stating, "I am convinced of the futility, indeed
the absurdity, of this court's persistence in adhering to the falsehood that
claim construction is a matter of law devoid of any factual
component. ' 45
A claim construction hearing is necessarily a factual inquiry,
despite its definition as a question of law. It frequently includes
competing testimony from experts, often requires the evaluation of
witness credibility, and always demands an examination of the meaning
and intent of words both as they are drafted by a litigant and as they are
understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art. The Supreme Court
reasoned that sometimes "'as a matter of the sound administration of
justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the
issue in question.' So it turns out here, for judges, not juries, are the
better suited...
There may be good reasons for judges, not juries, to construe
47
patents. The Supreme Court offers some reasons in Markman.
Arguably, de novo review at the CAFC is desirable because of the
Circuit's experience, technical expertise, and the benefits of national
consistency in claim construction. Even so, it is not clear that Markman
necessarily required that appellate review of the district court's
construction be without any deference whatever. Judge Mayer of the
Circuit writes that the CAFC's "unbridled" review is "irrational and
reckless" and allows the Circuit to "decide cases according to whatever
mode or method results in the outcome we desire."48 Instead of
achieving consistency, unfettered appellate review arguably causes
confusion and even threatens the legitimacy of the institution.49
Despite the sharp differences of opinion among the Circuit judges,
the Supreme Court has not stepped in to resolve the dispute or to address
whether its Markman decision necessarily implied a non-deferential

44.

Id. at 1045-46. Judges Gajarsa, Linn, and Dyk concurred in the denial of petition for

rehearing en banc. Judge Moore dissented fiom the denial of petition for rehearing en banc.
45. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Mayer, J., dissenting).
46. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388, (1996), quoting Miller v.
Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985).

47. See id. at 384, 388, 390. These include: the relative interpretive skills of judges compared
to juries, the special training and practice benefiting judges, and the desire for uniformity in
interpretation.
48.

Phillips,415 F.3d at 1303, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Mayer, J. dissenting).

49. 1d. ([W]e have ... focused inappropriate power in this court. In our quest to elevate our
importance, we have, however, disregarded our role as an appellate court; the resulting mayhem has
severely undermined the legitimacy of the process, if not the integrity of the institution.)
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appellate review. Perhaps the high court's reticence is due in part to the
CAFC's congressional mandate. The intention of the Circuit's creation
was to lessen the need for Supreme Court involvement in enforcing
national uniformity, consistency, and coherence in patent law.5 ° The
quasi-specialized Court has exclusive national appellate jurisdiction over
patent cases, in order to harmonize divergent legal approaches. 5' Indeed,
in the
the CAFC has succeeded in reducing the geographic variation
52
holders.
patent
of
benefit
overall
the
to
cases
patent
of
treatment
Unfortunately, the Court has been less successful in achieving
certainty and predictability.5 3 The Circuit overrules at least one-third of
trial court patent claim constructions. 4 The high reversal rate leaves
litigants unsure of their rights even after trial, and undermines
confidence in district court decision-making.5 5 It may be that increasing
central control by imposing non-deferential appellate review
paradoxically leads to decreased certainty and predictability for litigants.
While de novo review is the clearest example of an expanded role
for the appellate court in patent law, it is not the only instance of the
CAFC's singular influence over patent law and policy. 'Judicial
hyperactivity' is a term coined by William Rooklidge and Matthew F.
Weil to refer to "an intermediate appellate court [that] usurps elements
of the decision making process that are supposed to be the province of

50. S.REP. No. 96-304, at 14 (1979).
51. But cf Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts andthe Administrative Lawmaking System,
138 U. PA. L. REv. 1111, 1161 (1990) (arguing that specialized courts, deprived of alternative legal
approaches from other tribunals, frustrate the development of coherent substantive policy).
52. STEPHEN A. MERRILL ET AL., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 23 (2004);
William M. Landis & Richard A. Posner, An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Patent Court, 71 U. CHI. L.
REv. 111, 112 (2004).
53. See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How OUR
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM Is ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT,

56-64, 171 (2004); Matthew F. Weil & William C. Rooklidge, Stare Un-Decisis: The Sometimes
Rough Treatment ofPrecedentin FederalCircuitDecision-Making, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'y 791, 793 (1998).
54. Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases? 12
Fed. Circuit B. J. 1, 10 (2002); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim
Construction More Predictable?9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 231, 243 (2005); Christian A. Chu,
Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L. J.
1075, 1104 (2001); Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent Litigation:
The Time is Ripe for a Consistent Claim ConstructionMethodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175, 207
(2001); JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL A. MEURER, PA TENT FAILURE: How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS AND
LA WYERS PUT INNO VATORS AT RISK § 3.1(2008),

55. Improving Federal Court Adjudication of Patent Cases: Hearing Before the H.
Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, 109th Cong. 28 (2005) (statement
of Kimberly A. Moore).
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the lower courts, administrative bodies or even litigants., 56 The purpose
of the terms creation was to describe the unusually assertive role of the
Circuit in patent cases.
IV. JUDICIAL HYPERACTIVITY IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

In addition to claim construction, patent law under the CAFC offers
other examples of distinctive jurisprudence. The distinguishing trends
include: a shift of decision-making from the jury or the fact-finder to the
trial judge and ultimately to the appellate court, the Circuit's tendency to
create policy that discounts Supreme Court precedent or statutory
language, and an application of rules in a manner that does not align
with other appellate circuits' approaches. To a general civil practitioner,
patent litigation is notable for the court's paramount role in deciding
issues that seem factual.5 7 By characterizing key issues, as mixed issues
of law and fact, the trial court and the CAFC have more opportunity to
decide salient issues than is typical in ordinary civil cases.58
Some have stated that the obviousness determination is "one of the
more challenging legal feats in all of common law jurisprudence." 59
Historically, it seems that courts have been eager to devise tests that
ensure it remained so. In addition to being new and useful, an
innovation must advance the useful arts sufficiently to warrant the right
to exclude others by granting a patent. This advance, the "inventive"
step, has been difficult for courts to define. Past characterizations requiring "skill and ingenuity," 60 to "the flash of creative genius, ' '61 to a
synergism in which the whole of the innovation exceeds the sum of its
constituent parts or results in unusual or surprising consequences 62 were at least potentially subjective. These tests, imposed by the
generalist Supreme Court, left would-be patentees vulnerable to
hindsight bias, through which innovations might appear obvious with the
benefit of retrospection. This recast the inventiveness element with a
more objective standard based on "obviousness" with the 1952 passage

56. William Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil, Judicial Hyperactivity: The Federal Circuit's
Discomfort with its Appellate Role, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725, 727 (2000).
57. See Janine Robben, Who Decides? Specialized Courts v. the Jury of Peers, 65-JUL Or.
St. B. Bull. 9 (2005).
58. See e.g., Control Res., Inc. v. Delta Elec., Inc., 133 F.Supp.2d 121, 123-25 (D.Mass.

2001).
59.
60.
61.
62.

MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 311 (2d ed. 2003).
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 267 (1851).
Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84,91, (1941).
Great A.&P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152, (1950).
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of the Patent Act.63 The Supreme Court subsequently established a test
for obviousness 64 based upon a factual inquiry.65
Thereafter, the CAFC went to work telling the Supreme Court what
it meant to say.66 The Circuit converted the factual inquiry commanded
by the Supreme Court into an inquiry subject to a non-deferential review
by the appellate court.67 The judicial gloss developed in a manner that
facilitated appellate review, rather68 than produced a judicial metric that a
district court could readily apply.

Additionally, the CAFC materially altered the Graham language
when it elevated secondary considerations to a primary status, and it
significantly lowered the obviousness hurdle to patentability by
developing the teaching, suggestion or motivation standard for
combining prior art references. The reinterpretation of the explicit
language in Graham appears to this author to have been more than an
63. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
64. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 34(1966).
65. Id. at 17. "While the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law [citation omitted],
the § 103 condition ... lends itself to several basic factual inquiries. Under § 103, the scope and
content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue
are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this
background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such
secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc.,
might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter
sought to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries may have
relevancy."
66. For example, the Graham test used verbs that mandate a consideration of three issues in
determining obviousness (the scope and content of the prior art, the differences between the claims
and the prior art, and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art). Secondary considerations, in
the words of the Supreme Court, might be utilized or may have relevancy. But to the Federal
Circuit, "the secondary considerations are also essential components of the obviousness
determination." In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The authority cited for the
proposition that secondary considerations are "essential components of the obviousness
determination" was, ironically, Graham.
67. See Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1986),
(the district court had invalidated the patent for obviousness applying the Graham test, including the
so-called "objective" secondary factors. The CAFC reviewed the district court's factual findings,
agreeing or disagreeing without any significant level of deference. The CAFC then held "as a
matter of law, that the claimed subject matter ... would not have been obvious ... and therefore
reverse[d] the court's judgment to the contrary.") (emphasis added).
68. The Federal Circuit's gloss on obviousness doctrine - to necessarily include secondary
considerations, and to require some teaching, suggestion, or motivation (T-S-M) to combine
references - afforded the court many more opportunities to reverse a lower court. Moreover, the TS-M test, in effect, became inseparable from the obviousness determination; a nonobvious invention
lacked the T-S-M to combine references, while an obvious invention failed by virtue of some
teaching, suggestion or motivation. While that was tolerated for twenty years, the T-S-M gloss
seems to be the development that commanded the Supreme Court's attention in KSR. See also,
Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable? 9
LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 231, 247 (2005).
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ordinary common law interpretation and refinement of prior law. It was
a judicial rewrite of the Supreme Court's opinion by the CAFC.
Although KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,6 9 did not specifically
address the CAFC's promotion of secondary considerations from
potentially relevant factors to mandatory considerations,7 ° the Supreme
Court reasserted the continuing vitality of Graham as the controlling
precedent in obviousness determinations. The opinion opens with a
direct quotation of the Graham test, and immediately follows with the
unambiguous statement that the CAFC "addressed the question of
obviousness in a manner contrary to § 103 and our precedents.'
Clearly, the Circuit's approach to the obviousness inquiry had
diverged from that directed by the Supreme Court. The CAFC's
development of that approach is one example of distinctive
jurisprudence in the Circuit. Another notable instance is the Circuit's
proclivity for finding mixed issues of fact and law - a process that then
allows the appeal court to review trial court findings without deference.
The on-sale statutory bar to patentability offers another example,
like claim construction, in which law and fact are conflated in patent
cases. This combining affords the CAFC an opportunity to avoid
deferring to the fact-finder. The Patent Act states that a "person shall be
entitled to a patent unless ... the invention was ... in public use or on
sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the
application for patent in the United States..., When an invention has
been tested in real-life conditions, the issue arises whether the use was a
"public use." One Circuit panel ruled:
To determine whether a use is 'experimental,' a question of law, the
totality of the circumstances must be considered, including various
objective indicia of experimentation surrounding the use, such as the
number of prototypes and duration of testing, whether records or
progress reports were made concerning the testing, the existence of a
secrecy agreement between the patentee and the party performing the
testing, whether the patentee received compensation for the use of the

69. 127 S.Ct. 1727 (2007), discussed infra at § 6.1.
70. But, the Supreme Court may have indicated acceptance of the alteration by writing,
"While the sequence of these questions might be reordered in any particular case, the factors
continue to define the inquiry that controls." KSR Int'l Co., 127 S.Ct. at, 1734 (2007).
71. Id. at 1734
72.

35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
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invention, and the extent of control the inventor maintained over the
testing. The last factor of control is critically important....7
The panel concluded that evidence presented by the inventor
demonstrating that use of experimental prototypes was "of minimal
74
value when viewed in light of the totality of the other circumstances."
Thus, the totality of circumstances test - which purports to be a factual
issue - is equal to, coexistent with, and inseparable from the legal
conclusion on experimental use.75 Judge Rader, in a dissent to the denial
of an en banc rehearing made the point: "the Lough court had to separate
experimental use from its proper context of public use, then create a
separate list of required elements for a factual inquiry, and finally make
the separate list a question of law to avoid the deference due to the jury
verdict., 76 The analysis "shows the plastic malleability of a totality of
circumstances test when divorced from the discipline of a deferential
standard of review.,77
In most litigation, prevailing at trial is paramount. Trial courts have
considerable discretion in ruling on evidentiary matters and procedural
issues. Appeal courts will disturb such rulings only for abuse of
discretion, not merely because others would disagree with the ruling.
Appellate courts use deferential standards to review findings of fact by
trial courts 78 depending on the subject matter and the jurisdiction, e.g.,
manifest error, arbitrary and capricious, or clear and convincing error.
As a result, in many civil cases no reversible error exists. Even if an
error occurred, it may be harmless and the trial result will stand.
Prevailing at trial is essential, because the chances of securing a reversal
are minimal. Patent practice, particularly in the Circuit, is different.79

73.
103 F.3d
74.
75.

Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1996), reh'g en banc denied,
1517.
Id. at 1122.
Cf. McElmurry v. Arkansas Power & Light, 995 F.2d 1576, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1993)

(applying a totality of circumstances test on a case by case basis to determine whether, under
principles of fairness and equity, an employer enjoys "shop rights" to a patent). The review was
limited to whether the district court conducted a factually driven analysis of the circumstances. The
CAFC made no attempt to conflate the factual and legal conclusions or to elevate the standard of
review.
76.
77.

Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 103 F.3d 1517, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Rader, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1537.

78. See, e.g., FED R. CivIL P. 52(c).
79. One federal court made the point explicitly:
"The Federal Circuit is different. Unlike the other circuit courts of appeal, the Federal Circuit came

into being, in part, pursuant to an express Congressional mandate to foster uniformity in the
application of the law of patents. The Supreme Court refers to the Federal Circuit as 'a specialized
court,' and pays heed to its 'sound judgment' on patent law. Indeed the Federal Circuit views itself
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The legal standards that mix fact and law, the complexity and
proliferation of factual issues, and the willingness to reverse and remand,
or even to substitute the appellate court's findings despite these factual
issues, are consistent with a specialized court's tendency to expand its
influence within its field of expertise. 0
Until recently, another example of a distinctive rule in IPfor a nondistinctive concept involved enhanced damages and willfulness. 81 The
Patent Act provides for the possibility of enhanced damages, but is silent
as to the predicate for awarding them.82 Courts had little choice but to
fashion a test for when enhanced damages would be appropriate. The
Circuit developed the rule that an award of enhanced damages requires a
showing of willful infringement.8 3 Once again the CAFC turned to a
totality of circumstances test.84

Further complicating an already

malleable totality of circumstances test are alternative bases for finding a
case to be "exceptional" and thereby justify enhanced damages.8 5
Moreover, while the totality of circumstances test purported to afford
deference to the trial court's determination on willfulness, the variety of
potential factors, and the mixture of objective and subjective standards
of review applied to the factors provided little guidance to litigants.86
Another arguable example of the CAFC expanding its influence is
its treatment of the § 112 2 requirement that claims "particularly" and
"distinctly" claim the invention. The Circuit has been hesitant to invoke
the requirement:
[W]hat we have asked is that the claims be amenable to construction,
however difficult that task may be. If a claim is insolubly ambiguous,
as a substantive policymaker, a court with a mission...." Control Res., Inc. v. Delta Elec., Inc., 133
F.Supp.2d 121, 123 (D.Mass. 2001) (citations omitted).
80. "Almost since its inception, the Federal Circuit has been dogged with criticism for
straying from the path carefully delineated for appellate tribunals.... Increasingly, the bar is

expressing concern over the court's decision-making procedures and its apparent willingness to take
over the roles of patent examiner, advocate and trier of fact." Control Res., Inc. v. Delta Elec., Inc.,
133 F.Supp.2d 121, 123-24 (D.Mass. 2001).

81.

This discussion of the Federal Circuit's test for willfulness in enhanced damages cases

was recently recast in In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007), discussed
infra at § 8.

82. According to 35 U.S.C. § 284, "[T]he court may increase the damages up to three times
the amount found or assessed." Under 35 U.S.C. § 285, "The court in exceptional cases may award
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party."
83.
84.

Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 1980).
See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 819 F.2d 1120, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (willfulness

is not the only basis on which a court may find a case "exceptional." Misconduct during litigation,
vexatious or unjustified litigation, and frivolous suits are other cited examples.)
85. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826-27 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
86. Id.
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and no narrowing construction can properly be adopted, we have held
the claim indefinite. If the meaning of the claim is discernible, even
though the task may be formidable and the conclusion may be one over
which reasonable persons will disagree, we have held the claim
sufficiently clear to avoid invalidity on indefiniteness grounds.87

Invalidity determinations based on indefiniteness are not only
relatively rare at the CAFC, 88 but the reluctance to invoke the
definiteness standard overlooks both statutory directive and Supreme
Court guidance.89
Still other doctrines take on a particular gloss in the patent field
compared to their application in other areas of law. One example
involves the use of business records in determining patent priority
disputes. In typical civil litigation an exception exists to the hearsay rule
for records kept in the course of regularly conducted business. 90 In
patent cases, when proof of inventive activity is at issue, Rule 803(6)
conflicts with the "shopbook" rule,91 since such records are felt to be self
serving and fail as an independent corroboration 92 of the inventor's
testimony. 93 In an attempt to navigate the ground between the general
admissibility of business records and the anti-fraud purpose of the shopbook exclusionary rule, the Circuit has crafted a hard to define "rule of
reason' 94 that counsels reasonable consideration of all evidence in

87. Exxon Research and Eng'g Co. v. U.S., 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
88. Indefiniteness was the basis for only 5.8% of invalidity determinations in reported
decisions during 1989-96. John R. Allison and Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence On the
Validity of Litigated Patents (1998),
26 AIPLAQ.J. at 185-275 (1998), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract= 18149.
89. "[C]laims must be reasonably clear-cut to enable courts to determine whether novelty and
invention are genuine." United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1943). In
White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51 (1886), the Court warned that a patent is not "like a nose of wax
which may be turned and twisted in any direction, by merely referring to the specification, so as to
make it include something more than, or something different from, what its words express." 119
U.S. 47, 51, 7 S.Ct. 72, 74.
90. FED. R. EvwD. 803(6) (2009).
91. See KENNETH S. BROUN, 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 285 441 (6th ed.).
92. Adenta Gmbh v. OrthoArm and Am. Orthodontic, 501 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
"We have held that a patent cannot be invalidated based on one person's testimony alone without
corroborating evidence, particularly documentary evidence." See Finnigan Corp. v. Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 180 F.3d 1354, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
93. Horton v. Stevens, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1245, 1249 (1988).
94. Berry v. Webb, 412 F.2d 261, 266 (C.C.P.A. 1969) ('There is no single formula that must
be followed in proving corroboration"); Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 359 (Fed. Cir. 1985);
Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Holmwood v. Sugavanam, 948 F.2d 1236,
1238 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, 148 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir
1998).
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considering inventive activity.95 However, It stops short of following
Rule 803(6).96

Each of these examples - the CAFC's reinterpretation of secondary
considerations of obviousness, the treatment of mixed fact/law issues in
obviousness determinations and in on-sale statutory bar cases, the
2, and imprecision in the legal
restrictive interpretation of § 112
standards that allow the appeal court flexibility to overrule district court
determinations, can be viewed as the Circuit expanding its influence
within its field of specialty, i.e. as examples of "judicial hyperactivity." 97
The Supreme Court addressed none of these examples in its recent spate
of patent cases. Indeed one could argue that such judicial hyperactivity
is a desired trait of the CAFC that advances its mandate as a policymaking tribunal. Another concern relating to specialized courts insularity from other areas of law - is a theme that runs through several
of the recent Supreme Court cases.
V. IS THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT BECOMING INSULATED?

Academics and policy makers have expressed concern that the
Circuit may be intellectually and judicially isolated.98 The CAFC has
been criticized because its opinions and policies are inconsistent within
the Circuit.99 The CAFC produces the fewest signed opinions per judge
per year. l00 One might expect that the additional time spent by CAFC
judges on their signed opinions could be the result of an effort to

95. Jessica R. Underwood, ImpeachingFinneganand Realigningthe CorroborationStandard
for DisinterestedSingle Witness Testimony with Precedent and Policy, 17 FED. CIR. B. J. 53, 72
(2007).
96.

Lisa A. Doak, Patents without Papers: Proving a Date of Invention with Electronic

Evidence, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 471, 499 (1999); Steven N. Hird, Casenote, In Finnegan's Wake:
Recent Confusing Changes in the Federal Circuit's Requirement for Corroboration of Witness
Testimony DuringPatent InfringementLitigation, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 279-82 (2001).

97. "[A]n intermediate appellate court [that] usurps elements of the decision making process
that are supposed to be the province of the lower courts, administrative bodies or even litigants."
William Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil, JudicialHyperactivity: The FederalCircuit's Discomfort
with its Appellate Role, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725, 227 (2000).
98. E.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The FederalCircuit: A CaseStudy in Specialized Courts,

64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989).
99. See John R. Allison & Mark A Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote in Patent
Validity Cases, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 745, n.46 (2001); see also Matthew F. Weil & William C.
Rooklidge, Stare Un-Decisis: The Sometimes Rough Treatment of Precedent in Federal Circuit

Decision-Making,80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 791, 793-94 (1998) (identifying a number
of unresolved intra-circuit conflicts).
100.

Rochelle

Cooper

Dreyfuss,

The Federal Circuit: A

Continuing Experiment in

Specialization,54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 774 (2004) (citing an annual CAFC per judge rate of
11.55 signed opinions, compared with a federal appeals court average of 26.28).
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articulate the law more carefully, more consistently, or with greater
authority. If so, one would expect the opinions to be consistent among
Circuit panels,'' and to be relied upon by other circuits. But, data
addressing consistency does not support that position. Too often, courts
02
construe the same patent differently by the CAFC in successive cases.1
The court too frequently seems unable to articulate a single coherent
policy.' O3 According to data examined by Professors Landes, Lessig and
Solimine, CAFC judges are less likely than their regional circuit
counterparts to cite to opinions from within their own court. °4 This
raises the question of whether the court is sufficiently engaged in
meaningful policy debate that compares and analyzes differing
approaches - part and parcel of Anglo-American judicial tradition.
Another characteristic, "external consistency," may indicate the
degree to which a court attempts to coordinate its jurisprudence with that
of other courts as evidenced by the CAFC's citations to other federal
appeal courts.
This measure - while grossly imprecise' 5 - is
nevertheless striking. CAFC judges cite other circuit cases less than
1/10 t as often as other federal appellate judges cite to their sister
courts. 10 6 If one acknowledges that specialized courts carry a risk of its
bench and law becoming insular, 10 7 then this data - rough though it may
101. This characteristic is referred to as "internal consistency." Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The
Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 775-76
(2004).
102. Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases? 15
HARv. J. L. & TECH. 1, 19-20 (2001).
103. Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More
Predictable? 9 LEwis & CLARK L. REv. 231, 246 (2005); Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56
F.3d 1538, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Festo Corp. v. Shokestsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd.,
234 F.3d 558, 575 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 62 F.3d
1512, 1518 (Fed. Cir. 1995.
104. William M. Landis, et al, Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of
Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, table 1 at 277-78 (1998). In the Federal Circuit, judges
annually cited CAFC cases 44.8 times per year on average. By comparison, the average for all
federal appellate judges was 122.7 citations per year.
105. Since the regional circuits have limited opportunities to consider patent issues, they will
rarely be the source of relevant legal authority on substantive patent law. Additionally, whether the
lack of inter-circuit citation is the court's doing, or the result of limited citation by the patent bar, is
an open question.
106. William M. Landis, et al, Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of
Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 278-79 (1998).
107. Justice Stevens seems to recognize that possibility in his dissent in Holmes Group, Inc. v.
Vornado Circulations Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 at 838-39:
[W]e have already decided that the Federal Circuit does not have exclusive jurisdiction
over all cases raising patent issues. Necessarily, therefore, other circuits will have some
role to play in the development of this area of the law. An occasional conflict in
decisions may be useful in identifying questions that merit this Court's attention.
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be - should be of concern."" Undoubtedly, one would expect the
CAFC's limited and exclusive jurisdiction to reduce the number of
occasions that it would appropriately look to other courts for legal
authority, and vice versa. Even so, Landes, Lessig, and Solimine
conclude that Circuit judges have the least influence of any of the federal
judges.109
VI. RECENT SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT CASES
The Supreme Court has not addressed the scholarly criticisms of
internal or external consistency, nor has it directly spoken on the
potential negative consequences of specialization. However, the Justices
are concerned that the Circuit erred on several fundamental issues. In
the last two years, the Supreme Court reentered patent law with three
high profile cases"0 and an unusually pointed denial of certiorari
opinion. il"
The high court's attention was noteworthy for several
reasons. The number of cases accepted for review was high. 12 The
resulting opinions reversed well-established Circuit precedent. The
results, the level of attention, and the language of the opinions taken
together are a reproach to the CAFC. The Supreme Court scrutiny and
attitude raise questions about how intellectual property law - in the
opinion of the justices - has gone so wrong.

Moreover, occasional decisions by courts with broader jurisdiction will provide an
antidote to the risk that the specialized court may develop an institutional bias. (Case
citations omitted.)
108. See, Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in
Specialization,54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 774-75 (2004).
109. William M. Landis, et al, Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of
Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 303 (1998).

110. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, 547 U.S. 388, (2006); Medlmmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, 127 S.Ct. 764 (2007); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 1727 (2007).
111. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Lab.s, Inc., cert. dismissed 548 U.S. 124,12540) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
112. See also, Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 32 (2006), and
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S.Ct. 1746, 1759 (2007) (showing the Court decided two other
patent cases during 2006-2007). The last comparable period of Supreme Court activity in patent
law was in 1965-66.
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KSR - RestoringPrecedentand Common Sense to Obviousness
Doctrine

The Supreme Court used the KSR International Co. v. Teleflex,
Inc." 3 opinion to lecture the Circuit for disregarding long-standing
Supreme Court precedent.
We begin by rejecting the rigid approach of the Court of Appeals.
Throughout this Court's engagement with the question of obviousness,
our cases have set forth an expansive and flexible approach
inconsistent with the way the Court of Appeals applied its TSM test
here. To be sure, Graham [v. John Deere Co.114] recognized the need
for "uniformity and definiteness." Yet the principles laid down in
Graham reaffirmed the "functional approach" of Hotchkiss. To this
end, Graham set forth a broad inquiry and invited courts, where
appropriate, to look at any secondary considerations that would prove
instructive.
Neither the enactment of § 103 nor the analysis in Graham disturbed
this Court's earlier instructions concerning the need for caution in
granting a patent based on the combination of elements found in the
prior art. For over a half century, the Court has held that a "patent for
a combination which only unites old elements with no change in their
obviously withdraws what is already known
respective functions ...

into the field of its monopoly and diminishes the resources available to
skillful men."'
After admonishing the court for ignoring the dictates of fifty-yearold precedent, the opinion chastised the circuit for failing to apply
common sense in its legal standard." 16
The second error of the Court of Appeals lay in its assumption that a
person of ordinary skill attempting to solve a problem will be led only
to those elements of prior art designed to solve the same problem....
Common sense teaches, however, that familiar items may have
obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases a
person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple
patents together like pieces of a puzzle.... A person of ordinary skill
is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton .... Rigid

preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense,

113.
114.
115.
116.
1746.

127 S.Ct. 1727 (2007).
383 U.S. 1, 86 S.Ct. 684 (1966).
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 1727, 1739(2007).
The term, "common sense," appears five times in the KSR opinion. Id.at 1727, 1741-43,

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol3/iss2/4

22

Parker: Examining Distinctive Jurisprudence in the Federal Circuit
2009]

EXAMINING DISTINCTIVE JURISPRUDENCE IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

however,
are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with
lI
it.
it 117

What we hold is that the fundamental misunderstandings identified
above led the Court of Appeals in this case to apply a test inconsistent
with our patent law decisions. 118
From the perspective of many intellectual property constituencies lawyers, district courts, and technology innovators and users - KSR was
a sea change. 19 The opinion directed a profound alteration to the
Circuit's approach to obviousness analysis. 20 Yet from the Supreme
Court's perspective, the proper obviousness analysis had not changed
one iota; rather, the CAFC had diverged from the proper analysis. The
Supreme Court reaffirmed the Graham approach to determining whether
combinations of prior art are obvious.12 ' Thus, the opinion concluded
that

the Circuit -

the patent

specialty

court -

fundamentally

misunderstood one of patent law's basic issues. The Supreme Court
even seems to suggest that the CAFC had developed and applied its test
so rigidly as to defy common sense.
B.

eBay - Reintroducing GeneralPrinciplesof Equity to Patent
Injunctions

The KSR opinion was not the only recent Supreme Court case
criticizing the Circuit for using rigid rules that disregard established
legal doctrine. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange LLC 122 similarly took the
Circuit to task - this time on its standard for imposing injunctions in
patent infringement cases.
Injunctive relief, considered an extraordinary remedy in other fields
of law, has a four-part equitable test. The applicant must demonstrate:
(1) an irreparable injury, (2) inadequate remedies available at law, (3) a
remedy in equity is warranted in light of a balancing of hardships
between the parties, and (4) that the public interest would not be
117. Id. at 1742-43.
118. Id..
119. See Mark Nowotarski, Using KSR to Overcome an Obviousness Rejection, INTELL. PROP.
TODAY, March 30, 2009, http://www.iptoday.com/articles/2007-09-nowotarski.asp; Benjamin A.
Tranm, et al, Supreme Court Dictates Flexible Approach to Obviousness, INTELL. PROP. TODAY,
18-19, June 2007.
120. But, cf., Dystar Textilfarben GmbH & Co., v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (in which the CAFC claims that the T-S-M test is quite flexibility and requires the
application of common sense), discussed infra at § 6.1
121. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S.Ct. at 1739, 1745.
122. 547 U.S. 388, 126 S.Ct. 1837 (2006).
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disserved by granting the injunction.1 23 Some view injunctive relief as
an intrinsic and inseparable feature of intellectual property rights, since
two major intellectual property statutes recognize it.' 24 Patents, in
particular, grant the right to exclude others from infringing on the
claimed invention. In patent law the importance of, and the entitlement
to, injunctive relief had become a given if the patent was determined to
be valid, enforceable, and infringed. Prior to eBay only the rare case, in
which public health and safety stood in jeopardy if the patent was
enforced, led to a denial of 25
a permanent injunction on behalf of an
otherwise victorious patentee. 1
In eBay, the Supreme Court rejected the Circuit's application of a
"general rule, unique to patent disputes, that a permanent injunction will
issue once infringement and validity have been adjudged."' 126 Instead,
the Court directed judges to apply the four-part test for injunctive relief
used in every other field of law. 127 The eBay requirement that an
injunction will only issue after consideration of all four parts of the
equitable test changed IP law, because it conflicted
with years of
28
prevailing practice by lower courts in patent cases. 1
C. MedImmune - Applying OrdinaryRules of Standing to Patent
Challenges
In MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 129 the Supreme Court again
overturned an established intellectual property doctrine by rejecting the
Circuit's restrictive view of declaratory judgment standing for
challenges to patents by patent licensees. The CAFC's precedent had
123. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305,311-13, (1982); Amoco Prod Co.
v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542, (1987).
124. See Lanham Act 15 U.S.C. § 34-36, 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (2008); Patent Act 35 U.S.C. § 283
(2008).
125. City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577, 593 (7th Cir. 1934); see also
Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1015 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (excluding from
a preliminary injunction items that would deprive cancer and hepatitis patients of access to
otherwise infringing test kits).
126. eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1841.
127. Some practitioners now counsel litigants who require injunctive relief to proceed to the
ITC, which seems more prone to impose preliminary injunctions since eBay. Robert Hahn,
Assessing Bias in Patent Infringement Cases: A Review of International Trade Commission
Decisions, 3 (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies) (2007), available at http://aeibrookings.org/publications/abstract.php?pid=1 155. See also, John F. Rabena and Kim E. Choate,
Injunctive Relief in the ITC Post eBay, I AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 27 (2007).
128. Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Address at The IP Grab: The
Struggle Between Intellectual Property Rights and Antitrust, A Government Perspective on IPand
Antitrust Law (June 21,2006) availableat http://www.ftc.gov/ speeches/majoras/060621aai-ip.pdf.
129. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 764, 777 (2007).
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required a declaratory judgment plaintiff to show a "reasonable
apprehension of suit.','130 A patent owner cannot bring an infringement
suit against a patent licensee that is current with its royalty payments.
Thus, under the CAFC standard, licensees in good standing had no fear
of suit and therefore were effectively precluded from seeking a
declaratory judgment that the patent was invalid or unenforceable. The
Circuit's reluctance to allow licensees standing
to challenge seemed out
1 31
precedent.
Court
Supreme
other
with
step
of
The Supreme Court held that declaratory judgment jurisdiction was
much broader than the CAFC standard, that no actual infringement was
required, and that no default on royalty payments was required. 132 A
notable aspect of the Supreme Court opinion is its review of cases from
a wide variety of disciplines, not just patent or intellectual property
cases. While the MedImmune opinion does not carry the reproachful
tone of the eBay and KSR decisions, the CAFC recognized high court's
message; "the Supreme Court's opinion in MedImmune
represents a
133
test."
suit
of
apprehension
reasonable
our
rejection of
The KSR, eBay, and MedImmune decisions do not turn on
sophisticated issues of statutory interpretation of the patent act. They do
not involve applying existing statutes to new or unforeseen situations.
They do not address a split of authority among circuits or panels.
Certainly the effect of the three cases was to limit the availability of
injunctions, reduce the contractual insulation from attacks on validity
and enforceability by licensees, and strengthen the threat of invalidation
for obviousness. To some degree these cases may reflect a policy shift
by the Supreme Court to rebalance patent law by modestly strengthening
the legal position of potential infringers and heightening the obviousness
barrier to patentability. After all, such shifts seem to be periodic,' 3 4 and

130. Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cit. 2004).
131. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 663-67 (1969); see also, Kewanee Oil v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 473 (1974); Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 259 (1979);
Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 360 (1943); Edmund J. Sease, The Federal Circuit's Short
Circuit of Validity Challenges: Or, Is the Spirit of Lear Dead? 38 DRAKE L. REV. 229, 232-33
(1989).

132. Medlmmune, 127 S. Ct. 746, 777 (2007). The Supreme Court articulated a "substantial
controversy" test for standing.
133. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1380 (2007); Adenta Gmbh v.
Orthoarm, Inc., 501 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
134. F. M. Scherer, The Political Economy of Patent Policy Reform in the United States,
(September 2007 revision) (unpublished manuscript, available at www.researchoninnovation.org/
scherer/patpolic.pdf) (pp. 1-3 contain general background on periods of support and antipathy of
courts and Congress toward patent protection); see also, Gregory A. Castanias, et al., Survey of the
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are fitting to the IP field with its conflicting policy interests. However,
clearly and just as importantly the decisions are a rejection of the
Circuit's isolated use of precedent and its creation of distinctive legal
doctrines.
Intellectual property policy goals carry inherent tension. On one
hand the law seeks to encourage the use of new inventions and works, on
the other hand it promotes that innovation and creativity by restricting
propagation and use. The purpose, of course, is to create an incentive to
invest in, and ultimately to disclose and exploit, innovative and creative
activities. Getting the balance right is a continuing challenge. Justice
Breyer has stated one contemporary view succinctly: "sometimes too
much patent protection can impede rather than 'promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts,' the constitutional objective of patent and
copyright protection."'135 But except for Justice Breyer's sharp words which were made in a case the Supreme Court declined to review - the
Supreme Court's recent patent focus has been directed at the CAFC's
narrow legal approaches, not the CAFC's broad policy objectives.
Thus it appears that the Supreme Court is reigning in the Circuit at least in part - because the Circuit applied doctrines uniquely or
distinctively. In KSR, obviousness was recognized to have a common
sense meaning that the CAFC's rigid teaching, suggestion, or motivation
test had ignored. In eBay, the Circuit applied a principle of equity in a
manner the CAFC acknowledged was unique to patent law. And, in
MedImmune, the Circuit applied a restrictive standard to patent licensees
to trigger declaratory judgment jurisdiction.
VII. CRITICISM THAT MATTERS - THE SUPREME COURT WEIGHS IN

Theoretical models that warn of institutional isolation are one thing,
and criticism from courts and policy makers is quite another. In recent
years, especially, critics claim patent law has become too biased in favor
of patentees,

36

too lenient as to the patentable subject matter threshold,

too aggressive in extending injunctive relief, and too insulated from

FederalCircuit's Patent Law Decisions in 2006: A New Chapter in the Ongoing Dialog with the
Supreme Court, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 793,798-815 (2007).
135. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 127, cert. dismissed,
126 S.Ct. 2921, 2922 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
136. ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND IS DISCONTENT": HOW OUR BROKEN
PATENT SYSTEM Is ENDANGERiNG INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT, 56-64,

171 (2004).
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challenge by those with the incentive to do so, namely licensees.' 3 7 In
the past, CAFC itself rejected the potential for such bias. According to
Chief Judge Markey, "[tihe uninformed, unsupported, and unsupportable
assertion that the Circuit might somehow become biased in favor of
patents has apparently by now foundered on the facts.', 138 However,
fifteen years after Judge Markey's observation, the belief that IP rights
may inhibit innovation has gained traction at the Supreme Court, 139 and
the Court has reasserted its power.
Justice Breyer has written that "[t]he problem arises from the fact
that patents do not only encourage research by providing monetary
incentives for invention. Sometimes their presence can discourage
research by impeding the free exchange of information....,, 140 He further
suggests that the "generalist [Supreme] Court could contribute to the
...
important ongoing debate ... as to whether the patent system
14 1
adequately reflects the careful balance" that patent law serves.
Judge Rich, the first patent specialist appoint to the CCPA, a
preeminent jurist on the CAFC, and the author of the State Street Bank
& Trust Co. v. Signature FinancialGroup, Inc.142 opinion, would likely
have found Justice Breyer's observation that patents "impede the free
exchange of information" to reflect a profound misunderstanding of a
patent's fundamental purpose, public disclosure of the invention.1 43 This
difference of perspective is significant. To Judge Rich, patents promote
the exchange of information; to Justice Breyer they impede it.
Additionally, there is reason to suspect that the CAFC is suffering
from a perception that it is out of step with mainstream legal doctrine, is
substituting its judgment for that of the trial court, and has changed its
137. The issue of licensee's ability to challenge a patent's validity was addressed by the
Supreme Court in Medlmmune v. Genentech, 127 S.Ct. 764, 777 (2007). The Supreme Court has
recently granted certiorari to address whether the first sale doctrine exhausts patent rights despite
narrow license terms that exclude the licensee's customers who incorporate the licensed product
into their goods. Quanta v. LG Electronics, 128 S.Ct. 28 (2007).
138. Howard T. Markey, The FederalCircuit and CongressionalIntent, 2 FED. CR. B. J. 303,
305 (1992).
139. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, cert. dismissed,
126 S.Ct. 2921 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting); eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 396
(2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
140. Lab. Corp. ofAm. Holdings, 548 U.S. at, 127.
141. Id. at 2929 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, (1989)).
142. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cit. 1998).
143.

Judge Giles Rich, quoted by Janice Mueller, A Rich Legacy, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK

OFF. Soc'y 755 (1999). "[Tlhe patent ... is not only a grant of a right to exclude from the
government; simultaneously, it is a publication, making (in principle at least) a full public disclosure
of the invention due to section 112-1. So even if it does not go into the public domain during the
patent term, the public gets the advantage of knowing what the invention is and how to practice it."
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standards of review - the very concerns dismissed by witnesses at the
hearings that established the court.' 44 Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Scalia comments during the KSR oral argument reflect some of these
concerns. In response to counsel's observation that the teaching,
motivation or suggestion test is merely an analytical framework and
elaboration for objectively evaluating obviousness, the Justices pointedly
observed:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: It adds a layer of Federal Circuit jargon
that lawyers can then bandy back and forth, but if it's -- particularly if
it's nonexclusive, you can say you can meet our teaching, suggestion,
or motivation test or you can show that it's nonobvious, it seems to me
that it's worse than meaningless because it complicates the inquiry
rather than focusing on the statute.
JUSTICE SCALIA: It is -- I agree with the Chief Justice. It is
misleading to say that the whole world is embraced within these three
nouns, teaching, suggestion, or motivation, and then you define
teaching, suggestion, or motivation to mean anything that renders it
nonobvious. This is gobbledygook. It really is, it's irrational.
MR. GOLDSTEIN: Justice Scalia, I think it would be surprising for
this experienced Court and all of the patent bar -- remember, every
single major patent bar association in the country has filed on our side
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, which way does that cut? That
just indicates that this is profitable for the patent bar.
(Laughter.)
MR. GOLDSTEIN: Mr. Chief Justice, it turns out that actually is not
accurate.
JUSTICE SCALIA: It produces more patents, which is what the patent
bar gets paid for, to acquire patents, not to get patent applications
denied but to get them granted. And the more you narrow the
obviousness standard to these three imponderable
nouns, the more
145
granted.
be
will
patent
the
that
is
it
likely
This exchange appears to reflect concerns by Justices Roberts and
Scalia about characteristics associated with specialized courts:
distinctive jargon, increasing barriers to non-specialists, and the
expansion of the specialty court's influence within its field of expertise,
to the benefit of the court's dominant constituency.

144. Discussed at supra §5.
145. Transcript of Oral Argument at 40-42, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 1727
(2007).
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VIII. CRITICISM THAT MATTERS - AND THE CAFC RESPONDS

Whether or not one accepts the premise that the CAFC has
developed unnecessarily distinctive doctrine, and whether or not one
acknowledges that the Circuit has trended toward specialty court
behavior, there is certainly evidence that the Circuit is aware of the
Supreme Court's hovering presence over patent law. The Circuit
decided Dystar Textilfarben GmbH & Co., v. C.H. Patrick Co. 146 while
KSR was pending before the Supreme Court. Undoubtedly aware of the
concern that the teaching, suggestion or motivation test had narrowed
the obviousness inquiry nearly out of existence, the CAFC asserted that
the "test is in actuality quite flexible and not only permits, but requires,
consideration of common knowledge and common sense. 1 47
148
Another recent case, In re Seagate Technology, LLC,
demonstrates that the Circuit is more aware of the potential relevance of
other areas of law to patent issues since the Supreme Court's rulings in
2006 and 2007. The court's analysis of willful infringement begins with
the observation that "[t]he term willful is not unique to patent law, and it
has a well-established meaning in the civil context."' 149 The opinion
referenced copyright law, civil liability under the Federal Credit
Reporting Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Restatement of
Torts. The court adopted a willfulness standard that imposed both a
recklessness requirement 50 and a clear and convincing burden of
persuasion. 15 Whether the Circuit will ultimately exercise deference to
the fact finder's decisions on the elements will not be known until
enhanced damage issues under the new standard find their way to the
CAFC.
Even more recently, after years expanding the scope of patentable
subject matter, the CAFC recently decided a pair of cases 152 that
reasserted limits to patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Perhaps this
was a response to Justice Breyer's dissent to the denial of a writ of

146. 464 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
147. Id. at 1365. The opinion can be seen as a preemptive attempt to offer either guidance to,
or deflection from KSR, which was then pending before the Supreme Court. If so, it may have
achieved partial success; the high court cited Dysart with the observation that Dysart "elaborated a
broader conception of the TSM test than was applied" when KSR was before the circuit.
148. 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
149. Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1370.
150. "[A]n objectively high likelihood that [the defendant's] actions constituted infringement
of a valid patent." Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1371.
151. Id.
152. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007); In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1348
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
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certiorari in Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite
Laboratories,Inc., 1 which questioned whether State Street Bank's test
extended patentability too far.'5 4 In re Cominskey15 5 is notable, not for
its recitation of the principle that "mental processes - or processes of
human thinking - standing alone are not patentable even if they have
practical application," but because it actually applied that principle to
rule that a method of mandatory arbitration for unilateral and contractual
documents was not eligible subject matter for patenting. Similarly, In re
Nuijtenl'5 6 asserts that the list of statutorily enumerated patentable subject
matter - process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter - is
exclusive. The holding is noteworthy because the court's prior decisions
all but erased the categories in favor of an "anything under the sun that is
made by man" threshold of patentability. 5 7 Instead, Nuyten drew a
narrower test:
State Street sets forth a sound premise, but this case presents a
different situation. The essence of the dispute between the parties is
whether a transitory signal is covered by any statutory category. The
four categories together describe the exclusive reach of patentable
subject matter. If a claim covers material not found in any of the four
statutory categories, that claim falls outside the plainly expressed
scope of § 101 even if the subject matter is otherwise new and
useful.'58
So, one can see the CAFC responding to the looming presence of
the Supreme Court and Congress. The Seagate Technology opinion
referenced non-IP law to reverse and redefine its willful infringement
standard. 5 9 Some have called Seagate Technology a new and "more
proactive approach to aligning the rules of patent law with Supreme

153. 548 U.S. 124, 126 S.Ct. 2921 (2006).
154. "Neither does the Federal Circuit's decision in State Street Bank help respondents. That
case does say that a process is patentable if it produces a 'useful concrete, and tangible result.' But
this Court has never made such a statement..." Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs.,
Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126, cert. dismissed, 126 S.Ct. 2921, 2928 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
155. 499 F.3d. 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
156. 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Ci. 2007).
157. State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375
(Fed.Cir.i998). "The question of whether a claim encompasses statutory subject matter should not
focus on which of the four categories of subject matter a claim is directed to-process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter-but rather on the essential characteristics of the subject
matter, in particular, its practical utility." In fairness to the CAFC, though, the "anything under the
sun" language is that of the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,447 U.S. 303, 309(1980),
not the creation of the Federal Circuit.
158. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, (Fed. Cir. 2007).
159. Discussed atsupra§ 3.3.4.
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Court rulings in other areas of law."' 16
Similarly, Congressional
concerns over patent law have informed the Comiskey and Nuyjten
opinions.
[W]e decide this case against a backdrop of ongoing controversy
regarding the wisdom of software patenting and our decision in State
Street Bank. ... I appreciate the majority's desire to draw an
exclusionary line. However, mindful of our duty to interpret the law as
Congress wrote it rather than attempt 'to preempt congressional action
by judicially decreeing what accords with "common sense and the
public weal."' I respectfully disagree that the majority's holding is
compelled by or consistent with precedent or the language of the
statute. Indeed, I fear that it risks further confusing an already
uncertain set of doctrines. 161
These cases not only reverse the CAFC's long expansion of
patentable subject matter, but they specifically reflect the controversy
and scrutiny recently visited upon the patent system. One patent law
professor has characterized the Comiskey and Nuijten decisions as a
"gangrene treatment" that sacrifices some healthy patent law doctrine in
order to
prevent further damage to Circuit jurisprudence by the Supreme
16 2
Court.

IX. CONCLUSION
Patent law is deservedly specialized. It is also extraordinarily
important today - even more so than in 1933, when Judge Graham,
Chief Judge of the newly formed Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
observed:
While these patent and trademark cases are of vast importance to the
industrial life of the country, I can think of a number of things about
which both layman and judge could become more wildly excited.
Tabloid reporters do not haunt our confines, and newspaper

160. Kathleen Pauley Barecchia, In re Seagate: How Claims and Defenses for Willful
Infringement Have Changed, 14 No. 12 ANDREWs INTELL. PROP. LITIG. REP. 13 (2007).

161. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Linn, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). Judge Linn also purports to answer Justice Breyer's criticism of State Street Bank at footnote
5 of his concurring/dissenting opinion.
162. Posting of Dennis Crouch to Patent Law Blog (Patently -0), Ineligible Subject Matter: 35
USC 101 Finds its Teeth (biting into Nonobviousness), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/
2007/09/ineligible-subj.html (March 30, 2009). "In the political world of the courts, this case might
be seen as the CAFC's gangrene Treatment - where the Supreme Court is the disease and patent law
jurisprudence is the patient. Several toes have already been lost, and the CAFC is cutting off a foot
to prevent further the disease from reaching any further."
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photographers do not snap-shot us as we wait. The questions
presented are technical, and deal with every branch of mechanized, and
even plant, industry. Some of them cry to the very heavens in their
aridity. Tedious or not, the march of national progress in the arts
depends upon a proper and sensible construction
of these laws by the
163
Patent Office and its appellate judicial tribunal.
The bench and the patent bar need to ensure that patent
jurisprudence is soundly reasoned in law and policy. The specialized bar
and bench need to be aware of their tendency to become isolated from
other ways of solving difficult legal issues.
Much of this paper dwelt on the CAFC's heavy reliance on
characterizing issues as questions of mixed law and fact, and the
implications of de novo review. There is an argument that a court's
experience and technical expertise, and the desire for national
consistency justify the allocation of decision-making authority to judges
and appellate courts.
That argument reached its zenith with the
Markman and Cybor Corp. claim construction doctrine, as applied by
the CAFC.' 64 But the premise - that low deference to fact-finders and
high levels of intervention by appellate courts leads to consistency and
predictability - is not borne out in the areas explored in this paper. As
stated by CAFC Judge Mayer, "reviewing these questions de novo has
not clarified the law, but has instead distorted the appellate process,
causing confusion among the district courts and bar.' 65
Indeed,
Kimberly A. Moore, now a judge on the CAFC, concluded while still a
law professor:
With judicial claim construction now nearing its adolescence ...there
should be more predictability. The reversal rate ought to be going
down, not up. The fault, at this point, undoubtedly lies with the
Federal Circuit itself. The court is not providing sufficient guidance
on claim construction. There have not evolved any clear canons of
claim construction to aid district court judges, and in fact the Federal
Circuit judges seem to disagree among
themselves regarding the tools
66
available for claim construction.1

163. William J. Graham, The United States Court of Customs andPatent Appeals, Its History.
FunctionsandJurisdiction,14 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 932, 940 (1932).

164. Discussed atsupra § 3.1.
165.

Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Mayer, J., dissenting)

(quotations omitted).
166.

Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is

Claim Construction More

Predictable?9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 246-247 (2005).
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Professor Moore's comments suggest that the problems arise from
the court's inability to agree on definitive standards and metrics for
The social science literature suggests that
district courts to apply.
judicial hyperactivity can be attributed in part to the institution itself,
i.e., to the creation of a specialized court. As alluded to by Judge Mayer,
the unnecessary usurpation of decision-making authority has
institutional consequences for the Circuit:
This court was created for the purpose of bringing consistency to the
patent field. [Citation omitted.] Instead, we have taken this noble
mandate, to reinvigorate the patent and introduce predictability to the
field, and focused inappropriate power in this court. In our quest to
elevate our importance, we have, however, disregarded our role as an
the
appellate court; the resulting mayhem has seriously undermined
17
1
institution.
the
of
integrity
the
not
if
process,
the
of
legitimacy
This writer cannot conclude whether the problems of inconsistency,
confusion, and distinctiveness in patent doctrine arise primarily from the
quality of judging, from the quality of advocacy, from the influence of
specialization in the Courts and bar, or from a combination of such
factors. Additional research and empirical studies designed to measure
168
and compare the trial court reversal rates in different practice areas,
correlated by the appellate review standard might provide additional
insight into the potential effect of a specialized appellate court.169
In the meantime, the Supreme Court's recent cases suggest that the
Circuit erred on fundamental issues and applied rigid rules that
disregarded established legal doctrine. Since issuance of those opinions,
the CAFC may be endeavoring to align the rules it applies in patent law
to those existing in other disciplines. The Circuit's success in doing so
may ultimately preserve its institutional legitimacy and increase its
institutional effectiveness.

167. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Mayer, J., dissenting).
168. A potentially illuminating comparison would examine copyright cases reviewing
"substantial similarity" determinations, and trademark "likelihood of confusion" determinations.
Some regional circuit courts of appeals afford deference to the trial court on these issues, others
review them de novo.
169. If the CAFC behaves uniquely as a specialty Court, one would expect to see a difference
in reversal rates between the CAFC and the regional circuit courts in cases employing a comparable
standard of review.
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